The threat of regulation is clear when proposed legislation is introduced in Congress or when other regulatory bodies formally begin consideration of new, tighter requirements. When faced with proposed undesirable regulation, firms may attempt to deflect it in a variety of ways. Accounting and economics research suggests that firms use accounting policy choice as a means of reducing political costs. Prior to 2002, only two firms voluntarily expensed stock options under the provisions of FASB 123. By the end of 2003, a number of firms volunteered to expense stock options in the face of possible mandates from the FASB. A close examination of the record of regulators' activities indicates that, during 2002 and 2003, Congress proposed five pieces of legislation that would increase the tax costs of firms and six pieces of legislation that would increase the taxes of firm managers. We suggest that the decision to begin expensing options reflects firms' and managers' beliefs that the voluntary expensing of stock options for financial reporting purposes would ward off regulatory efforts to convert proposed tax legislation affecting the firms' and managers' taxes into enacted tax law. Our preliminary analysis provides evidence consistent with this general hypothesis. While prior research on the impact of taxes on accounting policy choice has examined accounting policy choice in response to enacted tax legislation, this paper provides early evidence on accounting policy choice in the face of proposed tax legislation.
Introduction
Between 1996 and 2005, firms had two alternatives for accounting for stock options: firms could elect to expense stock option grants on the income statement, or simply disclose in notes the effect on net income of expensing the options. 4 While there are several important similarities between the two periods (e.g., the nature of arguments for and against mandatory option expensing, the specific industries arguing against mandatory option expensing, etc.), there are two significant differences.
The first critical difference relates to expectations that expensing stock options would become mandatory.
The SFAS 123 project was highly controversial, drawing the attention of industry, the major accounting firms, venture capitalists, industry groups or associations, the Securities and Exchange Commission (-SEC‖), and even members of Congress. Overwhelmingly, the consensus was against required expensing of options (DeChow, Hutton and Sloan, 1996) . It is likely that firms assessed the probability of mandatory option expensing as extremely low By the time of the SFAS 123(R) project and largely due to the highly publicized accounting scandals, the political consensus had shifted. While certain industry groups supported the status quo of optional expensing, most capital market constituents supported its requirement. This led firms to assess the probability of mandatory option expensing as high (Aboody, Barth and Kasnik, 2004; Coyne, 2004) .
The second critical difference relates to the relevant regulatory landscape during the respective project periods. During the SFAS 123 project period, stock option expensing was the substantive proposal in the public space. Executive compensation had been the focus of recent regulatory attention: the SEC adopted rules requiring enhanced disclosure of executive compensation in 1992 and Congress enacted legislation limiting the deductibility of nonperformance based executive pay in 1993. However, there were virtually no other proposed regulations distracting firms from the subject of stock option reporting during that project period. In contrast, during the SFAS 123(R) project period, there were more than thirty proposed regulations addressing corporate governance, manager compensation and 4 Accounting researchers have reported on the political environment during both periods. Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1996) examine possible determinants of the likelihood of submitting a comment letter (during the SFAS 123 exposure draft period) opposing mandatory option expensing. Coyne (2005) links campaign contributions and sponsorship/co-sponsorship of proposed Congressional legislation to change or maintain stock option accounting (in advance of or during the SFAS 123(R) deliberations). Aboody, Barth and Kasnik (2004) examine firm and manager incentives for voluntary stock option expensing (in advance of or during the SFAS 123(R) deliberations). stock options, requiring firms to consider and respond to a variety of potential regulatory interventions. 5 These critical differences suggest that firms faced significantly differing incentives over the two periods with respect to their accounting for stock options. During the SFAS 123 project period, firms faced two questions:
 Given the current political environment, what resources should the firm expend to keep the probability of mandatory stock option expensing low?
 What are the costs and benefits to the firm of adopting proposed accounting policy with a low probability of enactment in the near future?
During the SFAS 123(R) project period, the questions faced were more complex.
 Given the current political environment, what resources should the firm expend to reduce the probability of mandatory stock option expensing from high to low?
 What are the competing political needs for those resources?
 What are the costs and benefits to the firm of early adoption of proposed accounting policy with a high probability of enactment in the near future?
 How is this decision to expense options affected by other regulatory interventions under debate?
Our focus is on the second period and we are most interested in the last question. We examine the regulatory environment during the SFAS 123(R) project period to more clearly identify the set of political costs facing firms. While previous literature points to pressure to reform corporate governance as well as stock option accounting and reporting practices, we note that the set of thirty plus regulations proposed during the SFAS 123(R) project period included five that would increase the tax costs of firms and six that would increase the tax costs of firm managers. Based on this, we conclude that firms may have used voluntary expensing of stock options as a means to deflect proposed tax legislation. In other words, firms and firm managers faced tax related as well as non-tax related political costs during the period 2002 to 2004, and the former may have provided incentives in the decision to voluntarily expense stock options. This paper analyzes the specific provisions of proposed tax regulation during 2002 and 2003. We examine the economic characteristics and tax attributes of a sample of firms, classified as -expensers‖ (those announcing voluntary expensing of stock options on their income statements) and -disclosers‖ (those continuing to disclose this effect pro forma in the notes). Our objective is to provide insight into a more 5 We identify the following as -regulators‖: Congress, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
We identify the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) as -standard setters.‖ complex decision environment than has previously been identified, as well as to lay the foundation for future empirical tests of the determinants of the expensing decision.
II. Political Environment
As discussed above, complex regulatory deliberations formed the backdrop for the SFAS 123(R) project period. Exhibit 1 summarizes the extensive set of proposed regulations arising from the deliberations, and reflects the breadth of regulations with provisions related to corporate governance, stock options or CEO pay during this time. The level of activity was intense: 28 regulations were proposed by 7 different Congressional committees and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by Congress in July 2002. The NYSE and NASD proposed 10 regulations; the SEC supplied 2. This record suggests that there was sufficient momentum for change for firms and managers to believe that these political authorities would likely enact a number and variety of regulations.
Firms and managers' expectations that option expensing would be required were strengthened by the activities of the FASB. While the Congress, the SEC and the stock exchanges deliberated corporate governance and stock option issues, the FASB reopened deliberation of stock-based compensation accounting. The FASB indicated that it expected to decide in early 2003 whether it might revisit its 1995 decision permitting companies to disclose the pro forma effects of stock-based compensation instead of recognizing an expense in the income statement. During the remainder of 2003, the FASB conducted further deliberations, concluding that compensation in the form of options resulted in a cost that should be recognized in the income statement and that fair-value was the appropriate measurement attribute. In November, 2003, the FASB announced that it would continue deliberations on the accounting and reporting for stock options through the fourth quarter of 2003, and that it planned to issue an Exposure Draft in the first quarter of 2004 and a final Statement sometime in the second half of 2004, with a proposed effective date for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2004 .
Exhibit 2 presents a detailed summary of a subset of the proposed regulations, i.e., those affecting the taxes of firms and managers, and highlights expected tax effects. Of the 11 proposed regulations, 5 affect the firm's taxes and 6 affect the manager's taxes. The decision to voluntarily expense options likely was impacted by the extent to which firms and managers believed they could potentially bear additional tax costs from tax-related regulations proposed during 2002 and 2003. In the following section, we examine the specific provisions of this set of proposed tax legislation to identify the extent to which firms and managers could be affected by increased tax costs.
III. Tax Related Political Costs
Both firms and managers faced threatened increases in tax related political costs as a result of the proposed legislation. We have identified six primary potential areas of concern:
 Increased taxes and other costs for domestic multinational corporations  Increased tax costs for foreign corporations  Loss of tax deduction for option expense  Additional required disclosures about income taxes  Acceleration of taxes on managers' option gains  Additional taxes and constraints on executive deferred compensation Each of these is discussed below in more detail, with an assessment of the implications of the threatened regulation on the decision to voluntarily expense options.
Increased taxes and other costs for domestic multinational corporations
The U.S. tax treatment of a corporate group with multinational activities depends upon whether the parent corporation is a domestic or foreign corporation. A corporation incorporated under federal or state law is classified as a domestic corporation for income tax purposes. A corporation incorporated under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction is classified as a foreign corporation.
In general, domestic corporations are taxed in the U.S. on worldwide income, whether from U.S. or foreign sources. A foreign corporation is subject to U.S. taxation only on the income that has sufficient nexus to the U.S. Thus, in general, a multinational domestic corporation will pay more in U.S. income taxes than a multinational foreign corporation.
As a strategy to minimize U.S. income taxes, a multinational domestic corporation may reincorporate in a foreign jurisdiction, replacing the group domestic parent with a group foreign parent. This strategy is commonly referred to as an -expatriation‖ or -inversion.‖ After expatriation, taxable income from foreign operations is no longer subject to U.S. taxation and group-wide tax costs are generally reduced. Inversions were a target of proposed tax changes. Five regulations (H.R. 3884, 3922, 737; S. 2119, 384) proposed taxing formerly domestic corporations which complete an inversion as if they continue to be domestic corporations (see Exhibit 2) . In other words, for income tax purposes, the inversion would be ignored, and the worldwide income of the (now) foreign corporate group would continue to be subject to U.S. taxation. The proposed regulations generally targeted corporate inversions after enactment (although S. 384 would apply to inversions after September 11, 2001) , and where the principal market for the public trading of the stock was in the U.S. In addition, H.R. 4831 proposed prohibiting expatriated firms from being eligible for the award of Federal contracts, and in addition to applying to expatriations after enactment, included a look-back provision to deny Federal contract eligibility for firms expatriating in the ten-year period preceding enactment. Domestic corporations with significant multinational operations would likely benefit most from a future inversion or expatriation and would therefore be concerned about these proposed regulations. Given the probability of mandatory expensing of options was high, domestic firms with significant multinational activities should be more likely to voluntarily expense options to reduce the probability that regulations denying the tax benefits associated with an inversion and Federal contract eligibility would ultimately be enacted.
Increased tax costs for foreign corporations
While largely undertaken to reduce taxes, expatriation also allows a foreign corporate group to further reduce U.S. taxable income by transactions that result in taxdeductible payments (such as rent, interest, royalties, management fees, etc.) by domestic group members to foreign group members (sometimes referred to as -earnings stripping‖). Such payments received by foreign group members from domestic group members are typically subject to U.S. taxation under IRC Section 861 and, under IRC Section 1441, at a rate of 30%. Tax treaties generally contain provisions for reduced tax rates on these types of payments, and in the case of a conflict between a tax treaty and a tax law provision, the U.S. courts attempt to apply both treaty and tax law in a way that does not result in a conflict between the two. In the case of a conflict however, the courts give deference to a congressional expression of intent to sustain or override existing treaty provisions. H.R. 4993 proposed denying any reduced rate of withholding, agreed to in a tax treaty, on a -deductible foreign payment‖ made by a domestic group member to a foreign group member, thereby making explicit Congress' intent to override existing treaty provisions containing reduced tax rates.
In addition to those provisions, H.R. 5095 called for the Secretary of the Treasury to conduct studies on (1) the effectiveness of current transfer pricing rules and compliance efforts, (2) whether the withholding tax provisions of income tax treaties are providing opportunities for the shifting of income outside the U.S., (3) whether anti-abuse mechanisms are functioning effectively, and (4) the effectiveness of current tax law on earnings stripping and expatriation activities.
We expect that foreign firms with significant U.S. source income have incentives to engage in taxplanning activities, such as deductible payments by domestic group members to foreign group members, to reduce the level of their U.S. federal tax liability. These firms would bear additional costs if the proposed regulations increasing U.S. taxes on certain types of U.S. source income were enacted. Given the probability of mandatory option expensing for financial reporting purposes was high, foreign firms with significant sources of U.S. income should be more likely to voluntarily expense stock options to reduce the probability that these regulations would become effective. Under SFAS 123, firms could choose between the intrinsic value method and the fair value method of accounting for options for financial reporting purposes. Properly constructing the terms of option grants could result in a zero valuation under the intrinsic value method; under the fair value method, option valuation is generally positive. For Federal income tax purposes, regardless of which financial reporting method is used, the deductible option expense is measured at option exercise, and is a function of the difference between exercise price and stock price at the exercise date and the actual number of options exercised. 6 Some firms likely believed that they would bear additional costs if the proposed regulation to constrain or eliminate the tax deduction at option exercise were enacted. The disallowance of the deduction would generally increase current and/or future tax liabilities. It could also impose other costs, such as increased debt contracting costs or increased tax planning costs, on firms. Given the probability of mandatory option expensing for financial reporting purposes was high, firms with significant tax deductions from options should be more likely to voluntarily expense stock options to reduce the probability that the tax deduction associated with option exercises would be constrained or even 6 To illustrate the differences across the two financial reporting option costs and tax reporting option costs, assume the following: (1) the number of options granted is 10,000; (2) the share price at option grant is $15.00; (3) the exercise price is $15.00; (4) the share price at exercise is $25.00; (5) the grant date value of the option is $5.00; and (6) 100% of options granted vest and are exercised. Ignoring constraints as to time of reporting, under these assumptions, option expense under intrinsic value reporting would be $0, under fair value reporting would be $50,000, and for tax reporting purposes, would be $100,000. If the proposed tax regulation were supplied, and the firm retained intrinsic value reporting, tax reporting option expense would be constrained in amount to $0. If the proposed regulation were supplied and the firm adopted fair value reporting, tax reporting option expense would be constrained in amount to $50,000. eliminated if the proposed tax-related legislation were ultimately supplied. (2) the amount reported as Federal income tax in filings with the SEC, (3) taxable income as shown on the income tax return, (4) adjusted book income, (5) the portion of book-tax differences attributable to depreciation, stock options, income from entities consolidated for book but not for tax, income from pension funds or tax-exempt funds, and -other items‖ that the Secretary of the Treasury deem necessary, and (6) an explanation of the book-tax differences required to be disclosed. The proposed regulation also called for a study, to be conducted by the Secretary of the Treasury, on corporate tax shelter activities. The additional disclosures contemplated by H.R. 1556 would constitute a significant expansion of income tax reporting over current financial reporting rules, as well as provide information to financial statement readers previously known only to the firm and the government. 7 Some firms likely believed that they would bear additional costs if the proposed regulations regarding enhanced financial statement disclosures of taxes were ultimately enacted. In particular, enhanced financial statement disclosures could provide a window into firms' tax sheltering activities (i.e., avoidance, abusive avoidance, or evasion), and invite the scrutiny of the government and investors. 8 While 7 In addition to proposed regulation from Congress with respect to enhanced financial statement tax disclosures about book-tax differences, firms were aware that the IRS and the Treasury were beginning to examine ways in which required tax reporting disclosures about book-tax differences could be expanded and/or enhanced. In June 2003, the IRS and the Treasury Department announced the formation of a joint working group to consider changes to book-tax disclosures required on Schedule M-1 of the corporate income tax return, Form 1120. Corporate taxpayers were also aware that the Treasury Department and the IRS were, during 2002 and 2003, studying ways to increase tax advisors' responsibilities for enhanced transparency of, and penalties for, abusive tax avoidance activities. 8 In terms of tax sheltering activities, tax avoidance (evasion) is generally understood as the legal (illegal) utilization of the tax regulations to reduce the amount of tax payable.
Loss of tax deduction for option expense

Additional financial statement disclosures about income taxes
firms engaging in tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance activities would bear the highest costs, even firms engaged in legitimate tax avoidance activities could bear costs following enhanced disclosures about tax sheltering activities. Costs associated with increased financial statement disclosures about taxes include public criticism of firm tax-sheltering activities, corporate -good citizen‖ arguments, increased IRS audits of prior returns, increased state and other authorities' audits of prior returns, disallowed deductions on prior returns, penalties, legal costs associated with defense or challenge of IRS assertions of tax evasion or abusive tax avoidance, etc.
In addition to concerns about enhanced financial reporting disclosures about taxes and tax sheltering activities, firms might also have been concerned about what those disclosures might reveal about earnings management. 9 If tax disclosures provide information on the firm's earnings management activities or if firms use tax expense to manage earnings, then it is likely that some firms believed they would bear additional costs if the proposed regulations regarding enhanced financial statement disclosures of taxes were ultimately supplied. Given the probability of mandatory option expensing for financial reporting purposes was high, firms concerned about enhanced financial statement tax disclosures (due to either tax sheltering or earnings management activities) should be more likely to voluntarily expense stock options to reduce the probability regulations requiring enhanced financial statement disclosure about book-tax differences would ultimately be supplied. This would impose costs on managers (i.e., accelerated payment of income taxes normally due at a later time) for a strategic decision by the firm (i.e., to expatriate). The proposed regulations would generally be effective for expatriations after enactment, although H.R. 5088 would apply to expatriations after September 11, 2001 .
Acceleration of taxes on managers' option gains
Given the probability of mandatory option expensing for financial reporting purposes was high, managers of expatriation candidate firms with significant amounts of unrealized gains on options should be more likely to voluntarily expense stock options to reduce the probability that regulations taxing those unrealized option gains would ultimately be supplied.
Additional taxes and contracting constraints on managerial deferred compensation
Four proposed regulations contained provisions relating to the taxation of managerial deferred compensation. The term -deferred compensation‖ generally refers to compensation earned by an employee currently, with the payment of such earned compensation deferred until a later time. Prior to the enactment of The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (-AJCA 04‖), taxability of deferred compensation was principally governed by tax doctrines and code sections. 10 Under these doctrines and code sections, deferred compensation is generally not taxable to the employee until received.
S. 1971 from the Senate Committee on Finance proposed denial of an exclusion from current taxable income for deferred compensation plans funded with assets located outside the U.S. In recent years, firms have funded nonqualified deferred compensation plans by setting aside the necessary funds in overseas accounts. 11 The effect of this proposal would be to accelerate the time of taxation of the compensation to the manager. H.R. 5088 proposed denial of an exclusion from current taxable income for deferred compensation arrangements for firms funding a 10 The tax doctrines we refer to are the constructive receipt doctrine and the economic benefit doctrine. The code sections we refer to are IRC Sections 83, 402(b) and 403(c). The funded/unfunded status of the deferred compensation plan also impacts the taxability of the compensation. 11 Because it is very difficult, if not impossible, for U.S. creditors of the firm to reach assets held overseas, regulators concluded that such accounts were effectively not subject to the claims of creditors, and therefore, not subject to substantial risk of forfeiture. If the funds are not subject to substantial risk of forfeiture, such funded deferred compensation should be treated as constructively received by the manager and taxable at the time the funds are set aside in the account. defined contribution plan with employer stock, unless the deferred compensation plan contains certain payout provisions. 12 The effect of this provision would be to eliminate manager discretion as to withdrawal of funds from the plan. In addition to these provisions, H.R. 5088 and H.R. 2101 both proposed the imposition of the golden parachute excise tax on deferred compensation plans following a major stock price decline or a declaration of bankruptcy.
Since the proposed regulations would all apply to amounts deferred after enactment, the extent to which managers would be subject to (and bear the costs of) additional taxes and/or constraints on deferred compensation plan payouts is a function of the extent to which amounts were deferred at the time of enactment (and therefore, grandfathered).
While managers with and without deferred compensation plans would both be concerned about the effect of payout constraints on deferred compensation amounts deferred after enactment, managers without deferred compensation plans would have the most to lose under the proposed regulations, as all amounts deferred under plans they might negotiate for with employers in the future would be subject to the proposed regulations. Given the probability of mandatory option expensing for financial reporting purposes was high, firms where managers do not participate in deferred compensation plans should be more likely to voluntarily expense stock options to reduce the probability regulations imposing taxes and payout constraints on executive deferred compensation plans would ultimately be supplied.
To summarize, once mandatory expensing of options appeared inevitable, some firms would act in anticipation of additional proposed regulation and expense their options pre-emptively as a strategy to deflect the additional regulation and resultant taxrelated political costs. These firms would likely share certain characteristics and include:
 domestic firms with significant multinational activities.  foreign firms with significant sources of U.S. income.  firms with significant tax deductions from options.  firms concerned about enhanced financial statement tax disclosures (due to either tax sheltering or earnings management activities).  expatriation candidate firms whose managers had significant amounts of unrealized gains on options.  firms where managers do not participate in deferred compensation plans.
IV. Economic Characteristics and Tax Related Attributes of Sample Firms
The primary purpose of this paper was to analyze in detail the complex regulatory environment during the 12 Under this proposed regulation, amounts set aside under a deferred compensation plan will be taxable to the employee at the time earned, unless the compensation is payable only upon separation from service, death, at a specified predetermined time or pursuant to a specified predetermined schedule.
SFAS 123(R) project period, in order to better understand firm motivation for anticipatory expensing of options. While a complete empirical analysis of the decision is beyond the scope of this paper, we wanted to provide an exploratory examination of the characteristics of expensing firms along the dimensions discussed above. We identified a sample of 347 entities that announced the voluntary expensing of stock options in 2002 and 2003. 13 We eliminated 41 real estate investment trusts (-REITs‖), 3 limited partnerships and 2 limited liability companies, leaving 301 corporations as the initial sample of expensers. The initial sample of disclosers is the firms in the S&P 1500 who are not expensers.
We impose several criteria on our initial sample for retention in the study. First, firms are required to have data available from the ExecuComp, Compustat Annual, Compustat Quarterly, and Compustat Segment databases to calculate the proxy variables for the hypothesized determinants.
Second, firms' financial statements and proxy statements must be available for hand-collection of data related to options outstanding and deferred compensation plans. Taken together, these data requirements reduce the initial sample to a final sample of 985 firms, of which 115 are expensers and 870 are disclosers. Table 1 presents the final sample of firms by SIC codes.
We developed variables to identify the firms likely to be concerned about proposed increases in firms' tax costs (variable definitions are included in Table 2 ).
To identify domestic firms with significant multinational activities and likely concerned about proposed tax increases upon expatriation, we create an interaction variable (US_MNC) to capture the extent to which a domestic firm (USINC) generates significant foreign source income (MNC), where US_MNC is the interaction of USINC and MNC. The indicator variable USINC takes the value of 1 (0) if the firm is a domestic (foreign) firm and the indicator variable MNC takes the value of 1 (0) if the ratio of the firm's foreign sales to domestic sales is greater than 1.0. We assume that when a domestic firm's foreign sales are larger than its domestic sales, significant incentives exist to make expatriation a realistic potential cost (i.e., tax) savings strategy (i.e., the firm is an -expatriation candidate‖).
To identify foreign firms with significant U.S. income and likely concerned about proposed tax increases on deductible payments, we create an interaction variable (FOR_WITH) to capture the extent to which a foreign firm (FORINC) has incentives to engage in earnings stripping activities (SALE_RATIO1), where FOR_WITH is the interaction of FORINC and SALE_RATIO1. FORINC is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 (0) if the firm is a foreign (domestic) firm and SALE_RATIO1 is the ratio of U.S. sales to total sales. We assume that higher levels of U.S. sales to total sales create incentives for foreign firms to use earnings stripping type deductible payments to move taxable income from the U.S. to a foreign jurisdiction.
We assume that the firms most likely to be concerned about the loss or reduction of the tax deduction from stock options (OPT_TAX) are positive marginal tax rate firms (MTRI) with large potential stock option tax deductions (OPT), where OPT_TAX is the interaction of MTRI and OPT. The indicator variable MTRI takes the value of 1 if the firms has a positive marginal tax rate, and is 0 otherwise. We use the methodology of Plesko (2003) to assign MTRI values.
14 With respect to potential stock option tax deductions, we hand-collect from financial statements the total number of options outstanding at year-end 2002, as well as the weighted average exercise price of those options. OPT is calculated as [(share price at year-end minus weighted average exercise price of options outstanding) X options outstanding at yearend] / pre-tax income. If share price at year-end is less than the weighted average exercise price of options outstanding (i.e., the options are underwater), then OPT is set to zero.
We assume that the firms most likely to be concerned about enhanced financial disclosures about taxes and book-tax differences are firms who are aggressive with respect to tax reporting. We follow Frank, Lynch and Rego (2005), who report that firms with more aggressive financial reporting also engage in more aggressive tax reporting, and use firm permanent book-tax differences as a proxy for aggressive tax reporting (PERM_DIFF). These authors define PERM_DIFF as {(pretax book income less income attributable to minority interest) -[(current federal income tax expense + current foreign income tax) / statutory tax rate] -(deferred tax expense / statutory tax rate)} / pre-tax income. Positive (negative) permanent book-tax differences indicate more (less) aggressive tax reporting. We assume a statutory tax rate of 35% for all firms and use the Compustat Annual database for the remaining variables required to calculate permanent book-tax differences. Our other variables are designed to identify firms where the manager is likely to be concerned about proposed increases in the manager's taxes. The proposed regulation calling for the acceleration of income taxes on managers' option gains would apply only to the managers of firms that might consider expatriation a realistic tax-saving strategy. We create an interaction variable (EXPAT_OPT) to capture the unrealized gains on unexercised in-the-money options held by managers (BIG) of firms who are expatriation candidates (MNC), where EXPAT_OPT is the interaction of BIG and MNC. We use the ExecuComp database to collect the unrealized gains on options (BIG) held by managers, and MNC is as calculated above.
Since we expect that managers without deferred compensation plans have the most to lose from the proposed regulation of deferred compensation plans, we use an indicator variable to indicate whether managers participate in a deferred compensation plan. DCOMPI takes the value of 1 if the manager does not participate in a deferred compensation plan and 0 otherwise. We hand collect the information on whether a manager participates in a deferred compensation plan or not from firms' proxy statements. Table 3 presents mean and median values for selected firm characteristics, along with results of t-tests (Wilcoxon tests) of differences in means (medians) across the two samples, expensers and disclosers. With respect to economic characteristic and tax attributes, with limited exceptions, the expensers differ significantly from the disclosers.
Descriptive Statistics
Statistically, differences are significant at the 10% level or less.
In terms of economic characteristics, consistent with the findings of previous researchers (Aboody, Barth, and Kasnik 2004), Table 3 indicates that the expensers are significantly larger than disclosers, at both the mean and median. This finding is also consistent across a variety of measures of firm size, including total assets, total sales, pre-tax income, net income and market value. Table 3 also indicates that the expensers are more likely to be foreign firms and are more likely to have positive marginal tax rates. Expensers are marginally less likely to be multinational firms (their foreign sales are less than U.S. sales and U.S. sales as a percentage of total sales is slightly higher for expensers than for disclosers, but not significantly so). The expected tax deductions from options are significantly larger for expensers than for disclosers, and the unrealized gains from options for CEOs are significantly lower for expensers than for disclosers. In terms of tax attributes for purposes of tax-related political costs, Table 3 indicates that expensers are significantly less likely to be expatriation candidates (i.e., U.S. domestic firms with significant multinational activities) than disclosers. This evidence is consistent with recent findings of Rego (2003) , who suggests that U.S. domestic firms with significant multinational activities may be more concerned about foreign pre-tax income and tax burdens than U.S. pre-tax income and tax burdens. Rego (2003) basis this conclusion on her finding that lower U.S. pre-tax income and tax burdens of U.S. domestic multinational firms are significantly associated with investments in tax planning. If expatriation candidate firms are less likely to be concerned about threatened increases in U.S. taxes, then expatriation candidate firms are less likely to be expensers. Therefore, it appears that threatened tax increases for expatriation candidate firms may not have factored into firms' decisions to expense options. Table 3 indicates that expensers are significantly more likely to be foreign firms with higher ratios of U.S. to foreign sales, consistent with concern of foreign firms about proposed regulation that would have the effect of overriding preferential treaty tax withholding rates. It appears that threatened tax increases for foreign firms may have factored into firms' decisions to expense options. Table 3 indicates that expensers are also significantly more likely to be positive tax rate firms with significant option tax deductions, consistent with the notion that these firms were concerned about the threatened loss of a significant tax deduction. Thus, it appears that the threatened loss of the tax benefits associated with options may have factored into firms' decisions to expense options. And finally, Table 3 indicates that expensers had significantly larger permanent book-tax differences than disclosers, consistent with the notion that these firms were concerned about heightened tax disclosure requirements (possibly due to either tax sheltering or earnings management activities). Thus, it appears that the threatened additional financial statement tax disclosures may have factored into firms' decisions to expense options.
In terms of impact of the built-in gains on unexercised options of managers on decisions to expense options, we do not find a statistically significant difference between the sample of expensers and disclosers. This is not surprising, in that we found earlier that expensers are less likely to be expatriation candidates than disclosers. If expensing firms are less likely to be expatriation candidates, then managers of expensers will also have less concern about potential additional costs, since those costs would be triggered only by the firm's decision to expatriate. In addition, Table 3 suggests that managers of expensers are more likely to have deferred compensation plans than disclosers, but not statistically significantly so. This suggests that the threat of additional taxes and other costs for managerial deferred compensation plans did not play a role in firms' decisions to begin expensing options.
V. Summary
In The prior literature on the relation between tax and accounting policy choice has provided evidence on firms' accounting policy choice in response to specific examples of enacted tax regulation or proposed financial accounting standards. We have analyzed firm behavior as proactive as well as reactive, examining firm accounting policy choice in the face of a complex web of threatened tax regulation as well as changes in accounting standards. It appears that firms may use accounting policy choice to influence the outcome of the tax-related regulatory process, as well as to respond to new regulation. See Table 2 for variable definitions 
